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## INDEX



What about the cloud?

ENS & CPSTIC Catalogue







Qualifying services

Experiences

Conclusions





## ENS (RD 311/2022)

## Artículo 19. Adquisición de productos de seguridad y contratación de servicios de seguridad.

 En la adquisición de productos de seguridad o contratación de servicios de seguridad de las tecnologías de la información y la comunicación que vayan a ser empleados en los sistemas de información del ámbito de aplicación de este real decreto, se utilizarán, de forma proporcionada a la categoría del sistema y el nivel de seguridad determinados, aquellos que tengan certificada la funcionalidad de seguridad relacionada con el objeto de su adquisición

## Article 19. Procurement of security products and contracting of security services.

 In the acquisition of security products or contracting of information and communication technology security services to be used in the information systems within the scope of application of this Royal Decree, those that have certified security functionality related to the object of their acquisition shall be used, in proportion to the category of the system and the determined security level.







### **CPSTIC Catalogue** What is it?

## CPSTIC is the reference catalogue for cybersecure ICT products in the Spanish Public Administration. It offers a **list of products with security assurance contrasted by the CCN (the Spanish Certification Body)**.

This catalogue includes **approved products** for handling classified national information **qualified products** for use in the ENS (a.k.a. the governmental 27001).

### Advantages

- 1. Easy acquisition of cybersecure products.
- 2. Evaluated by a reliable third party.
- 3. Available to everyone (not just the administration).







## **CPSTIC CATALOGUE** Cybersecurity evaluation methodologies

- Fixed-time methodology
- National scope
- Comprehensive standard oriented to vulnerability analysis and penetration testing.
- Limited duration and effort
- Economically feasible
- Accesible to SMEs
- Main use for catalogue inclusion
- Spanish National Standard

#### **Medium-basic ENS category**



- Heavy methodology
- International scope, recognized in more
  - than 30 countries
- Different assurance levels
- Versatile, applicable to all types of
  - products
- Technically hard to meet/understand the standard
- Longer time to achieve
- Higher economic cost

#### **High ENS category**







### **CPSTIC Catalogue** Security Target and taxonomies

 The ST (Security Target) collects the security functional requirements implemented by the TOE, as well as the security problem definition.

The taxonomies define a set of security functional requirements. E.G. The EDR/EPP taxonomy defines the following requirement (one among many) that every TOE that wants to enter the catalog under the EDR/EPP family must fulfill.

Contents of the ST are reviewed by CCN before approval, avoding scoping or TOE vs Product problems.

38. MAL.1 En caso de que se detecte contenido malicioso en el espacio de memoria de un proceso, se deberá interrumpir la ejecución del mismo.



#### **4** Security Problem Definition

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**4.1 Operational Environment Assumptions** 

This section includes assumptions about the environment where the product is run.

Assumption	Description
A. Physical Protection	The product must be installed in an area where access is only possible for authorized personnel and under suitable environmental conditions.
A. Limited functionality	The product must be used for network routing and filtering as its basic function and not provide any other functionality, except for certain compatible communication protection-oriented ones.
A. Reliable Administration	The Administrator will be a trusted member and will look after getting the best security interests on behalf of the organization. It is therefore assumed that such an administrator is trained and free from any harmful intent in handling the product. The product will not be able to protect itself against and administrator user with bad intentions.
A. Periodic Updates	The product's firmware and software will be updated as updates that correct known vulnerabilities are released.
A. Credential Protection	All credentials, especially the administrator's credentials, must be properly protected by the organization who uses the product.
A. Security Policy	A security policy should reflect the set of principles, organization and procedures required by an organization to address its information security needs, included the use of ICT.





## **CPSTIC Catalogue** Evaluation, certification, qualification

#### Evaluation

An independent, accredited laboratory verifies whether a product meets its claimed security functionality in a time and effort constrained manner.

#### Certification

The Certification Body issues a certificate according to the security functionality stated by the manufacturer.





Experiences evaluating cloud services and products.

#### Qualification

A certification has been passed according to the security functionality required by CCN.







## WHAT ABOUT The cloud?

### More and more SaaS

- The SaaS market is currently growing by 18% per year.
- Around 85% of small businesses have invested in SaaS options

## Existing methodologies are product-based

- Common Criteria
- Spain (LINCE), France (CSPN), Germany (BSZ), The Netherlands (BSPA).







## WHAT ABOUT THE CLOUD? IT-015 Requirements for certification of products deployed in the cloud





#### REQ-3

Full control of the infrastructure

#### REQ-6

Univocal identification





### WHAT ABOUT THE CLOUD? Common Criteria efforts

The CCUF TC "The CC in the Cloud Technical Work Group (CCitC)" is developing a guide of Essential Security Requirements for Common Criteria in the cloud.

\*https://github.com/CC-in-the-Cloud/CC-in-the-Cloud.github.io/blob/ main/ESR/CC\_in\_the\_Cloud\_ESR.pdf The National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP), Canada Common Criteria Scheme (CCCS), and Australian Certification Authority (ACA) agree with the content of the CC in the Cloud Essential Security Requirements (ESR), version 0.3, dated 2 March 2022.

\*https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/GD/CC%20in%20the%20Cloud%20 Position%20Statement%20v1.0.pdf









## **WHAT ABOUT THE CLOUD?** Evaluation, certification, qualification

#### Known evaluation gaps

- Analysis is static
- Use of cryptography
- Platform abstraction
- Environmental evaluation





The current standard does not allow for service evaluations. We are focused on product evals in a devops deployment

#### New threat models

- Configuration
- Credentials
- Data sovereignty
- Key management
- Insider threat
- Multi-tenant





## SO, HOW CAN WE QUALIFY SERVICES? 8050001080000

España y CCN como referentes en la evaluación de ciberseguridad de soluciones en la nube





## **CPSTIC CATALOGUE**



### Very practical approach: we **need** secure services







## **QUALIFYING SERVICES** History of the CCN-STIC 106 Guide

#### Naive approach

- 1. On-premise certification (including methodology pentesting)
- Deployment in the cloud 2.
- Pentesting in the cloud (5 days) З.
- 4. + ENS cloud provider

Problem: Most cloud services are cloud-native

#### Most common approach

- 1. We use LINCE adapted to the cloud on top of the already deployed service
- 2. No additional pentesting required as it is already included in the initial LINCE-based assessmentl
- 3. + ENS cloud provider

Problem: Who qualifies the hyperscaler services?





Experiences evaluating cloud services and products.



Connecting all the dots

1. Hyperscaler services also want to be

qualified









## **QUALIFYING SERVICES** Task 1: Requirements Analysis

- The first task consists of defining to which taxonomy the service to be qualified belongs. In addition to the appropriate taxonomy, every cloud service must fit into another taxonomy "Cloud Services" (Annex G).
- The next step is to analyze the service, defining its components and the scope of the TOE. After this, a new document, the SFR Rationale is generated in which all the SFR included in the taxonomy are listed and the following labels are applied to them









## **QUALIFYING SERVICES** Task 2.1 ST Writing

- After finishing the SFR Rationale, the ST is generated. This ST collects the RFS Applicable and those that Cannot be Tested (Witnessing and Vendor Affirms) but are in the scope of the TOE.
- The SFR defined in the ST are subsequently verified in the laboratory through witnessing, functional and penetration tests. For this purpose, use is made of any interface available in the TOE.









Task 2.2 ST assessment and generation of the ETR

The laboratory is responsible for validating the ST and generating the ETR (Evaluation Technical Report).



For this we will use the LINCE methodology adapted to the cloud.

- The limit of effort and duration of the methodology is eliminated, adapting it to the scope of the TOE.
- Certain tasks are not applicable, e.g. installation phase.
- More flexibility is allowed in certain aspects, e.g. product versions







### Task 3. Security architecture

The manufacturer must provide some assurance on the security of the cloud architecture. For this purpose, the manufacturer shall define in the document "Cloud Security Architecture":

- a) The separation in blocks of the solution.
- b) The connection between blocks.
- c) Which third-party services used by the solution are qualified (e.g. AWS S3)
- d) What sensitive data is handled by the solution and how the flow of this data is handled

The cloud where the service is hosted must be ENS certified and GDPR compliant.







Task 4. Cloud form Responsible statement

The veracity of the "Vendor affirmed" SFRs and the information provided in the Cloud Security Architecture is guaranteed.

The data handled by the solution complies with the stipulated geographical limits.

2

5

4

Incident response capabilities and corresponding description.

Cryptographic capabilities management details.







Documentation validation







## **EXPERIENCES**







## **EXPERIENCES**

- Average number of tests: 30
  - Average failed tests: 5
- Average number of pentests: 24
  - Average failed pentests: 4





#### Number of cloud projects





## CONCLUSIONS

- All existing methodologies are for evaluating on premise products.
- No methodology for evaluating cloud products is expected at European level.
- It will probably take years for standardize how to deal with this...
- CCitC TC is focused in evaluating DevOps while we are dealing with evaluating SaaS using a CC based approach.
- Spain is a pioneer country in <u>qualifying</u> (not certifying) cloud services







## CONCLUSIONS

CRA (9) "This Regulation ensures a high level of cybersecurity of products with digital elements. It does not regulate services, such as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), except for remote data processing solutions relating to a product with digital elements understood as any data processing at a distance for which the software is designed and developed by the manufacturer of the product concerned or under the responsibility of that manufacturer, and the absence of which would prevent such a product with digital elements from performing one of its functions" [...] [Directive XXX/XXXX (NIS2)] applies to cloud computing services and cloud service models, such as SaaS. All entities providing cloud computing services in the Union that meet or exceed the threshold for medium-sized enterprises fall in the scope of that Directive.







# Thank you

